The Nexus between Social Capital and Reintegration of Ex-combatants: A Case for Sierra Leone by Leff, J
9
The Nexus between Social 
Capital and Reintegration of 
Ex-combatants:  
A Case for Sierra Leone
Jonah Leff  * 
* Jonah Leff is a consultant for the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey, where he has focused 
on issues ranging from African security to the impact of small arms and light weapons on 
children. In 2007, he received a Masters in Public Administration in International Management 
from the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Abstract
Following the end of the cold war, the international community shifted 
its attention from duelling ideological warfare to the many intra-state, 
or internal armed conflicts occurring globally. In response, the United 
Nations, along with a wide array of aid agencies, have invested greater 
and greater time and resources in post-conflict environments. When 
peace is reached after conflict, economic and social conditions are not 
conducive for ex-combatants to reintegrate on their own. Programmes 
that address ex-combatants as well as broader post-conflict recovery are 
essential. Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) is one 
such programme that has received widespread attention. Policy analysts 
have debated the factors that contribute to a successful DDR programme. 
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This study examines reintegration, the final phase of DDR, arguing that in 
order to achieve successful reintegration of ex-combatants, a community-
focused approach that generates social capital must be implemented. Using 
a comprehensive literature review of social capital and community-based 
reintegration and a thorough case study from Sierra Leone, this paper will 
demonstrate the relationship between social capital and reintegration. 
Introduction
Since the end of the cold war, the international community has shifted its 
focus from what for decades was characterised by duelling ideological warfare 
to the many masked internal armed conflicts taking place throughout the 
world. In doing so, international organisations and States have placed post-
conflict peacekeeping and reconstruction at the top of their humanitarian 
and development agendas. The development community has recognised 
that the insecurity that persists in the aftermath of armed conflict can 
impede development efforts and progress toward meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals and sustainable peace. There is also evidence that 
insecurity, intensified by the prevalence of small arms and the ex-combatants 
that possess them, can have a negative impact on the economic and social 
conditions of countries emerging from conflict (Muggah 2005). At the 
end of conflict there is often a surge of ex-combatants entering the highly 
competitive labour market. Many times ex-combatants lack skills, assets, 
and social networks that enable them to create sustainable livelihoods. 
As a result, ex-combatants may return to war or a life of criminality and 
banditry that could adversely affect the peace process. Providing support 
for ex-combatants is therefore central to any post-conflict reconstruction 
process. This study will examine how international organisations can best 
support the reintegration of ex-combatants into society.
In response to the challenge of building human security in post-conflict 
settings, the international community has instituted a programme most 
commonly referred to as Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration 
(DDR) – three distinct yet overlapping components. Under varying 
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nomenclature, DDR programmes are implemented by the United Nations, 
the World Bank, international and local non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) as well as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) nations. In his report to the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC), Kofi Annan reaffirms, ‘the matter of disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in a peacekeeping 
environment as part of its continuing effort to contribute to enhancing the 
effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building activities… 
has repeatedly proved to be vital to stability in a post-conflict situation; to 
reducing the likelihood of renewed violence, either because of a relapse into 
war or outbreaks of banditry; and to facilitating a society’s transition from 
conflict to normalcy and development’ (UNSC 2000a:1). 
Through processes such as the United Nations’ Integrated DDR Standards 
(IDDRS), the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) and the Multi-donor 
Reintegration Programme (MDRP), there has been a growing acceptance 
that DDR, as opposed to simply a military activity, must be treated as a 
political, social, and economic process that intersects with sustainable 
long-term development (Bell & Watson 2006). Whereas disarmament 
and demobilisation primarily focus on the individual, reintegration shifts 
from the individual to the community that the ex-combatant is relocating 
to. In order for DDR programmes to succeed, sufficient resources and 
planning must be invested in the reintegration phase. It has been shown 
that in cases where donors have reduced or eliminated funding prematurely 
during reintegration, ex-combatants have been likely to resort back to 
lives of violence and crime. If left untreated, ex-combatants may form 
criminal gangs and militia groups, partaking in crime based on trade in 
drugs, stolen goods, and illicit weapons (Muggah 2005), as was the case 
in Angola, in the late 1990s, where reports linked high levels of crime and 
banditry to the failure of the DDR programme (UNIDIR1 1999).While 
all three elements of the DDR process are equally important in restoring 
peace and security, this paper will primarily focus on reintegration, 
the longest and most often neglected phase of DDR. The successful 
1 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
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reintegration of ex-combatants presupposes that there is a community that 
is socially and economically ready and able to receive them. However, this is 
often not the case. Having reviewed a wide range of literature explaining the 
reasons for successful reintegration of ex-combatants (dependent variable), 
this study will focus on social capital (independent variable) as a causal 
determinant of successful reintegration. Utilising a thorough literature 
review of social capital and community-focused reintegration and an 
in-depth case study of community-based reintegration in Sierra Leone, this 
study will link social capital with reintegration success. In order to measure 
success in Sierra Leone, three dependable reintegration evaluations will be 
used to operationalise the indicators for successful reintegration. 
Social capital
Background
Social capital is a multidimensional term that has been defined by several 
social scientists, all pointing to human relationships as a resource or form 
of capital just as valuable as human and monetary capital. Robert Putnam 
describes social capital as networks of trust, which are based on agreed 
upon norms that can enhance efficiency through collaborative action 
(Putnam 1993). In Francis Fukuyama’s seminal work, Trust, he highlights 
the importance of association and formation of civil society, claiming that it 
can only take shape in communities with shared norms and values. Out of 
such shared values, he argues, comes trust, which when mobilised becomes 
an economic value (Fukuyama 1995).
Social capital is the fabric that creates the bonds necessary for civil and 
civic society to effectively put policies in place. Strong social capital forms 
connections that cross ethnic, religious, income, and gender lines, providing 
a basis for post-conflict mediation, management, and mechanisms for 
sustaining peace and development. Before liberalising economic and political 
institutions, it is vital to build horizontal and vertical social capital, so that 
newly established frameworks will have a dependable base from which to 
operate. This includes developing an efficient, non-corrupt bureaucracy and 
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judiciary, a free press, and a participatory civil society. Social networks are 
integral features of peacekeeping and fulfil an important role in instituting 
reconstruction and reconciliation measures in post-conflict states. 
Countries emerging from conflict with vibrant civil society organisations 
and networks among its citizens can often regenerate social capital that may 
have deteriorated during the conflict. 
Social capital and armed conflict
During armed conflict, social capital is often hijacked and used to form 
allegiances in the warring parties. In other words, combatants join a new 
social unit that rewards them with social status and a means to earn a living. 
In some cases, social capital is generated in the formation of demanding the 
right to economic equality or simply identifying a common enemy. Such 
was the case in Rwanda, where Hutus used ethnic-based common values to 
rationalise the massacre of almost 1 million Tutsis (Colletta & Cullen 2000). 
It is often difficult for combatants to stop fighting, because the ‘war family’ 
(Hazen 2007:1) defines their identity and is a source of security. Moreover, 
violence contributes to social fragmentation by polarising communities 
and forcing individuals to take sides during the conflict. Citizens are likely 
to withdraw from institutions with crosscutting ties, retreating to formal 
groups based on greater alliances, such as race and religion. This breakdown 
is important for survival, but has damaging impacts on the economy. For 
instance, when trust is destroyed, transaction costs rise due to the extra 
measures that must be taken to ensure proper delivery of goods and services. 
In addition, tolerance levels decrease and discrimination grows as groups 
lose the ability to interact outside of their own.2 
Post-conflict societies that have been involved in human rights abuses and 
mass killings are often left with low levels of trust and damaged social capital. 
As for ex-combatants, the DDR process strips them of their social status, their 
sense of importance, their income, and their support network (Hazen 2007). 
This is exacerbated by the reluctance of communities to accept the return 
of ex-combatants, who in many cases had committed atrocities in the very 
2 Phone interview with Nat Colletta on December 8, 2006
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communities that they wish to return to. In Uganda, for example, distrust 
and resentment were widespread during the initial stages of demobilisation 
and reintegration. Communities were unwilling to accept the return of 
ex-combatants that had terrorised their lives for so many years. In some 
cases, this led to hostilities and alienation in the early phase of reintegration 
(Colletta et al 1996).
In order for ex-combatants to reintegrate, they must relinquish ties with 
wartime social networks, and reacclimatise themselves with a new social 
structure, which includes unfamiliar norms, beliefs, and laws within the 
community. Making this transition can be confusing and psychologically 
traumatic for ex-combatants and the communities that they return to. 
Therefore, successful long-term reintegration, as part of the DDR process, 
can positively impact conflict resolution processes and the rebuilding of 
social capital (Colletta et al 1996). On the other hand, failure to conduct 
well planned and funded reintegration programmes can lead to further 
deterioration in social capital, poor economic conditions, and possibly 
violence. Reintegration programmes that use existing community 
organisations enable communities to take ownership of development, 
while facilitating the reintegration of ex-combatants. Informal networks 
among ex-combatants, such as discussion groups, veterans’ associations, 
and business ventures are key elements for successful economic and social 
reintegration. These networks are especially powerful in societies where 
social capital is scarce (Colletta 1997).
Social capital must be transformed and catalysed so that both ex-combatants 
and the community can benefit from the many networks of trust that result. It is 
essential that ex-combatants be fully engaged in the formation of civil society, 
which is both a by-product and a generator of social capital (Levinger 2005). 
To achieve this, economic and social reintegration must be embedded in 
a larger process that addresses ex-combatants within the development 
framework of their communities. This paper will examine reintegration, 
claiming that without a community-focused approach that fosters new, and 
nurtures pre-existing, forms of social capital, ex-combatants will be less 
likely to secure sustainable livelihoods in post-conflict environments.
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Community-focused reintegration 
As opposed to targeting ex-combatants on an individual level, community-
focused reintegration demands more flexible timetables and funding from 
donors, and views the reintegration process as a means of equally benefiting 
ex-combatants and community members. The World Bank estimates that it 
costs approximately US$1,200 to turn an ex-combatant into a civilian, with 
a job and a role in his or her community (World Bank 2005). This figure 
does not take into account the need to deliver funds for varying costs based 
on the needs of ex-combatants vis-à-vis their communities. Reintegration 
programmes that solely focus funds on the ex-combatant may be neglecting 
those in the community most affected by conflict. Hence, in the past few 
years, there has been a pendulum swing from individual to community 
reintegration. Nat Colletta, formerly of the World Bank, argues that there 
must be a balance between targeting individual ex-combatants in the short-
term to bring about security and stabilisation and targeting communities in 
the long-term to encourage identity change, acceptance in the community, 
and economic integration.3 This approach aims to provide a wide range of 
services for which there is demand to both ex-combatants and community 
members (USAID4 2005). DDR programmes that only target ex-combatants 
have received criticism, claiming that those that have been perpetrators 
of violence unjustifiably benefit from skills training, and are rewarded 
with cash packages, while community members are neglected. Although 
it has been shown that transitional cash payments ultimately benefit the 
community (Willibald 2006), it is only natural for community members 
to develop animosity toward ex-combatants when such support is issued. 
Services to ex-combatants must be offset by programmes that directly 
benefit communities. 
A community approach to reintegration ensures that ex-combatants are given 
training in skills that suit the demand of the job market. In Mozambique, 
ex-combatants were unable to find employment in the areas in which they 
3 Phone interview with Nat Colletta on December 8, 2006
4 United States Agency for International Development
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were trained. This highlights the need for training programmes to be designed 
around the needs of the local community and to job opportunities that are 
realistic. This can be achieved through labour market surveys, demographic 
assessments of ex-combatants, or by using key informants at the community 
level (UN 2006). Linking the needs of the community with relevant skills 
training enables ex-combatants to take steps toward sustainable livelihoods.
BOX 1 – Reintegration Impact Indicators
Percentage of ex-combatants the programme has returned to full •	
time education or sustainable productive economic activities.
Percentage of child ex-combatants the programme has placed •	
into full time education, training, apprenticeship, or income 
generating activities.
Level of participation of ex-combatants in community groups, •	
associations, and unions.
Level of crime among ex-combatants.•	
Level of social conflict reported between ex-combatants and •	
civilians.
Prevalence of the use of the term ‘ex-combatant’ in the •	
community.
Source: Arthy 2003
DDR programmes can be structured to help communities as well as 
ex-combatants. For instance, establishing health centres for ex-combatants 
usually demands that existing health facilities and services be upgraded. 
With proper coordination and consultation with community leaders, such 
improvements can benefit community members (UN 2006). Additional 
reintegration methods that can be employed to nurture social capital are: 
Stopgap programmes 
Media and public awareness campaigns 
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Community development projects  
Programmes for special target groups 
 Reconciliation programmes 
Stopgap programmes
Between the demobilisation and reintegration phase, it is sometimes beneficial 
to undertake stopgap programmes for ex-combatants. These are 2-3 month 
programmes that pay ex-combatants for demining and for the construction 
of community infrastructure, such as schools, water systems, hospitals, roads 
that may have been damaged or destroyed during the war (Caramés 2006). 
This is a crucial period for ex-combatants, when they often rearm and resort 
to banditry if their basic needs are not being met. Stopgap programmes can 
fill this gap, providing short-term employment for ex-combatants, while 
benefiting the community in the process. These programmes frequently are 
an entry to reconciliation between ex-combatants and their communities. In 
some cases, ex-combatants and community members have worked together 
forging relationships between the two groups. While stopgap programmes 
can be highly beneficial, they should not replace the main reintegration 
mechanism. Stopgap programmes certainly contribute to social reintegration 
and community building, but such programmes rarely build long-term skills 
and seldom lead to sustainable livelihoods. Therefore, stopgap programmes 
should not take the place of broader employment initiatives (UN 2006).
Media and public awareness campaigns
The establishment of social cohesion between ex-combatants and 
communities is essential to lasting peace. Particularly at the onset of 
reintegration, relations between ex-combatants and community members 
are far from normal. Ex-combatants are often perceived as bringing violence 
or being a burden to the community. Public education and awareness 
about the war and the return of ex-combatants is a central component of 
the reintegration process. The dissemination of information in schools, the 
media, and in communities not only prepares communities for the arrival 
of ex-combatants, but aids in the reconciliation process as a tool for crisis 
The Nexus between Social Capital and Reintegration of Ex-combatants
Jonah Leff
18
prevention (Douglas et al 2004). Furthermore, campaigns can develop an 
understanding among stakeholders that DDR’s purpose is not to reward 
ex-combatants, but rather to equip them with skills and provide them with 
counselling so that they become valuable assets in rebuilding the society 
toward greater security and peace (UN 2006). 
Community development projects
Community development projects that employ ex-combatants and 
community members can be very beneficial toward rebuilding trust and 
starting reconciliation. During these programmes, implementing agencies 
develop a decision-making body with representatives from community 
members and ex-combatants. With a focus on future development, project 
groups can achieve conflict resolution through planning projects as opposed 
to dwelling on the conflict itself.5
The World Bank-assisted Community Reintegration and Development Project 
in Rwanda best illustrates this approach. The project focuses on reassigning 
decision-making authority from the organisation to the community level, 
strengthening partnerships between the local administration and the local 
population, and building trust and cooperation within and between the 
local government and the population. The majority of the projects strive to 
improve food security, strengthen the capacity of farms and businesses, and 
repair infrastructure. Under the plan, each group is allocated $240,000 to fund 
three to five year Community Development Plans (CDP) (World Bank 1999). 
This participatory approach to development empowers local communities to 
take ownership of progress toward a peaceful future. 
Programmes for special target groups
Special groups include female, child, disabled, and sick and/or elderly 
ex-combatants (Specht and the TRESA Team 2006). Until fairly recently, 
DDR programmes have not taken into consideration the needs of female 
ex-combatants. In Security Council resolution 1325 of 2000, however, the UN 
declared the need for all aspects of reintegration to take into consideration 
5 Phone interview with Nat Colletta on December 8, 2006
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the gender dimensions of armed conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. 
Point 13 of the resolution clearly  ‘encourages all those involved in the 
planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the 
different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account 
the needs of their dependants’, and in point 15 the resolution, ‘expresses its 
willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender 
considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation 
with local and international women’s groups’ (UNSC 2000b).
Women experience conflict differently from men. Time and again women 
are victims of sexual as well as armed violence. This requires that women 
receive psychological counselling and support from women’s associations 
within the community. In addition to fighters, women are often used as 
messengers, cooks and war wives, which are roles that don’t always require 
being armed. Consequently, women are excluded from the DDR programme 
when they are without a weapon to turn in during the disarmament phase 
(Harsch 2005). While they may not need to be involved in the early phases 
of disarmament, it is essential that women are encouraged to participate 
and are supported through demobilisation and reintegration. Trust and 
understanding can be accomplished through awareness campaigns in the 
community that focus on sensitising families and potential employers of 
the hardships that female ex-combatants experienced during the conflict 
(UNIFEM6 2004).
In Nicaragua and El Salvador, where females comprised approximately 30 
percent of the total combatants, women were excluded from demobilisation 
and reintegration by their male counterparts. In response, women formed 
ex-combatant associations to support one another in their reintegration 
(Watteville 2002). This also gave rise to decision-making power that women 
so often lose during the DDR process. In Uganda, the Uganda Community 
Based Association for Child Welfare (UCOBAC)/UNICEF7 project funded 
groups in the interest of promoting income-generating projects to improve 
gender relations within the community (Colletta et al 1996). These 
6 United Nations Development Fund for Women
7 United Nations Children’s Fund
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associations are particularly effective in countries with poor women’s rights 
records.
Special support is also required for former child soldiers. During war, 
children experience a psychological trauma that differs from that of adult 
combatants. Their exposure to violence and insecurity has a deep impact 
on their social and emotional development. Separate protection and 
rehabilitation programmes are required, especially for girl soldiers who are 
often denied assistance during demobilisation and reintegration. For child 
ex-combatants, reintegration should be family- and community-focused, 
and should aim to reunite children with their families, provide psycho-
social care, and afford them with access to education and vocational training 
(Kingma 1997b).
Reintegration programmes that address the needs of disabled and chronically 
ill ex-combatants, and those with HIV/AIDS, lower the chance that these 
groups will be neglected by the community or the health care system (UN 
2006). Assistance to these groups demands that resources be channelled to 
health and counselling services. This not only benefits the community’s 
medical infrastructure, but also creates social bonds between health care 
providers and ex-combatants. 
Reconciliation programmes
Reconciliation is both a process and a goal that intersects with DDR and the 
broader post-conflict reconstruction process. Furthermore, it is a process 
that includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness and healing, and is 
rooted in the idea that societies are capable of moving from a ‘divided past 
to a shared future’ (IDEA8 2003:12). Reconciliation involves acknowledging 
past wrongs and grievances in the hope of moving toward attitudinal 
changes that will eventually pave the way for developing a shared vision 
of the future, in which people can live harmoniously without returning to 
conflict (Hamber & Grainne 2004). Unfortunately, in more cases than not, 
countries return to conflict. An example of this can be seen in Guatemala’s 
8 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
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return to conflict twice over a 40 year period of civil war (1954-1994). These 
events resulted in 180,000 deaths, 40,000 disappearances, the devastation of 
400 villages, and displacement of over 1 million people (Colletta & Cullen 
2000). 
Typically, reconciliation is generated through three institutional practices: 
war crime tribunals, truth commissions, and peace commissions (Douglas 
et al 2004). While these methods have proved successful, local processes, 
such as traditional ceremonies and cleansing rituals, have sometimes 
proved more effective than formal ones. Community-based processes are 
more accessible and many times more efficient than state-run methods. By 
involving communities in utilising local structures, customs and values, 
differences can be reconciled through a participatory approach that leads to 
authentic trust between parties (Duthie 2005).
Cleansing rituals played a critical role in reintegrating Mozambique 
National Resistance (RENAMO) fighters into communities in Mozambique. 
The healing process consisted of symbolical rituals designed to purify 
the identity of the individual and reintegrate him or her back into the 
community (Honwana 1998). In some cases, ex-combatants spent their 
demobilisation money on gifts to be given to village elders (Kingma 1997b). 
The capacity for Mozambicans to utilise local instruments for healing and 
forgiveness is testimony to the importance of home-grown reintegration. 
With a community-focused approach, formal reintegration programmes 
can assist in the facilitation of traditional practices. 
Following the brutal rule of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, institutional 
reconciliation processes did not take shape. There have been, however, 
some notable community initiatives. The UNDP-sponsored9 Cambodia 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Programme (CARERE) is one such case. 
From 1993 to 2000, CARERE contributed to reconciliation by setting up 
elected village development councils (VDC), which were responsible for 
overseeing development projects along with strategies to foster community 
cohesiveness. VDCs offered support to families, religious and local 
9 United Nations Development Programme
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organisations by facilitating activities that emphasised ritual and communal 
understanding. CARERE’s area-based approach brought opposing parts 




Sierra Leone received independence from Britain in 1961. Beginning with 
the Margai brothers of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), the country 
was ruled by one corrupt leader after another. In 1967, the SLPP lost power 
to the All People’s Congress, which was led by Siaka Stevens, who gained 
support through his mobilisation of rural communities against wealthy 
urbanites. During Stevens’ seventeen-year rule, power was consolidated 
into a one-party state, stripping civil society of its role in political life. An 
economic crisis brought about by political corruption and international 
economic factors spawned widespread discontent throughout the country. 
By 1982, Sierra Leone’s flourishing diamond and iron industry had been 
taken over by a group of corrupt firms that funnelled the majority of profits 
to government leaders and foreign investors (Adebajo 2002).
In 1985, Stevens relinquished power and handed leadership to Joseph 
Momoh. Under Momoh, the economy continued to decline as well as the 
diamond business, which had been appropriated by smugglers and corrupt 
companies. 
Amid growing dissatisfaction, a civil war erupted in March 1991, when 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels, backed by Liberian rebel leader 
Charles Taylor, entered southeastern Sierra Leone. Foday Sankoh, leader of 
the RUF, met Charles Taylor in the late 1980s while undergoing military 
training in Libya. The two rebel leaders agreed to support one another in 
overthrowing their respective governments using the diamond mines in 
Sierra Leone to finance their incursions (International Crisis Group 2007). 
Charles Taylor was committed to toppling Sierra Leone’s government, so 
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that they would withdraw troops from the Economic Community of West 
African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peace operation in 
Liberia (Ginifer 2005).
In 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) took control, and 
later joined forces with the RUF. Their rule was characterised by extensive 
human rights abuses and dissolution of the rule of law. In 1998 the AFRC/
RUF were driven out by ECOMOG, who reinstated President Kabbah. In 
1998, it was estimated that between 60,000 and 80,000 combatants were 
engaged in fighting – out of a population of about 4.5 million. The total 
number of deaths from the conflict is unknown, but is most commonly cited 
at around 50,000 (Ginifer 2005). 
On July 7, 1999, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of Sierra Leone, and 
Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, sat down in Lomé, Togo, to sign a peace 
agreement ending eight years of fighting (Dobbins et al 2005). On October 
22, 1999, the Security Council launched the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone (UNAMSIL) to oversee the peacekeeping mission. With the support 
of UNAMSIL, the World Bank and the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID), the National Committee for Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), a governmental organisation 
lead by President Kabbah, was established to spearhead the DDR process in 
1998 (Ball et al 2004).
The first few years of the DDR process saw little progress due to outbursts of 
violence and lack of political will. However by 2002, the DDR programme 
had succeeded in disarming 72,490 combatants, far exceeding the expected 
45,000. Of the disarmed, 71,043 were demobilised and 56,751 registered 
with NCDDR (see box 2). Of the 56,751 ex-combatants that applied for 
demobilisation, 56,127, nearly 100 percent, filed for reintegration assistance 
(Comninos et al 2002).
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BOX 2 - Sierra Leone DDR Figures
DDRP's Beneficiaries   NCCDR September 2003 No. Ex-combatants
Combatants Disarmed (phases I, II and interim) 72,490
Ex-combatants demobilised (children included) 71,043
Ex-combatants discharged 
(by receiving identification cards) 69,463
Child ex-combatants demobilised 6,845
Ex-combatants registered to receive reintegration 
assistance 56,751
Ex-combatants having received or receiving  
reintegration assistance 48,233
Discrepancy between the numbers disarmed, demobilised and 
discharged reflects combatants lost during the January 1999 attack 
on Freetown and those rearmed and remobilised during the Fall 2000 
security breakdown at the end of Phase Interim.
Source: Ball et al 2004
Community-focused reintegration
Social capital eroded during the conflict, damaging support networks and 
institutional ties. The use and threat of small arms deeply undermined 
systems of trust and organisational cooperation. In both urban and rural 
settings, social cohesion was destroyed, which led to divisions and at times 
robbery among neighbours (Ginifer 2005). With this in mind, NCDDR took 
a community-centred approach to reintegration. The National Recovery 
Strategy states that a community approach should be adopted, and that 
long-term reintegration will only be accomplished by engaging host 
communities with an equal share of resources afforded to ex-combatants 
and non-combatants (Sierra Leone National Recovery Strategy 2002).
The NCDDR Training and Employment Programme (TEP) was established 
to offer ex-combatants options for social and economic reintegration. The 
main areas of training were in carpentry, car mechanics, tailoring, and 
agriculture. In addition to training, the programme offered psycho-social 
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support and counselling (Comninos et al 2002). NCDDR also encouraged 
ex-combatants to find work that benefited the community, such as public 
works, street cleaning, and construction. In addition, education programmes, 
peace education, music and sports groups have been established to restore 
social capital (Ginifer 2003). 
Stopgap or temporary work programmes proved to be successful for 
reintegrating ex-combatants. In addition to giving them access to money at 
a critical time, ex-combatants were able to prove themselves to community 
members by working side by side with them on community projects. 
These often broke down social barriers, built confidence, and formed new 
social ties. This was especially advantageous for ex-combatants who were 
displaced, unable to rely on families for financial and moral support (Arthy 
2003). The UK-backed Community Reintegration Programme (CRP) 
and the German aid organisation, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), played a leading role in community-focused 
reintegration throughout Sierra Leone. Their projects targeted badly 
affected communities by setting up employment opportunities and social 
reintegration programmes for ex-combatants (Ginifer & Oliver 2004). 
In order to sensitise and build trust within the community, NCDDR 
conducted information dissemination exercises. These were 
complemented by campaigns in the media and on radio stations 
countrywide (Ginifer 2003). Religious leaders found it helpful to use 
radio as a means of reaching out to affected communities. Through a mix 
of prayer, information, and song, reconciliatory processes were broadcasted 
throughout the country (Comninos et al 2002). Radio UNAMSIL also 
played a leading role in addressing issues such as crime, justice, tolerance, 
forgiveness, and peace (Ginifer 2003).
Many ex-combatants returned to their place of origin to reunite with 
families. In other cases, ex-combatants were given access to land, which 
can sometimes lead to disputes over land and past grievances. However, 
ex-combatants have reported acceptance from neighbours. This is due in 
part to the establishment of Joint Farms that placed ex-combatants and 
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civilians together, working collectively. Once settled, ex-combatants were 
encouraged to join organised groups centring on themes, such as agriculture, 
trade, sports, culture (Arthy 2003). 
Reintegration was especially difficult for women, who suffered psychological 
trauma during the conflict. Many women were sexually abused and 
separated from their families. This was compounded at the onset of 
reintegration by a myriad of false perceptions by other ex-combatants and 
community members. Suspicions arose that stigmatised women as being 
overly violent and having diseases, such as HIV and sexually transmitted 
diseases (STDs). This soon faded when women had the opportunity to work 
with others during training. Women that received training often ended up 
acting as mentors for other war-affected women (Comninos et al 2002). 
GTZ set up Women’s Welfare Committees in all its supported communities 
to assist women with microcredit and other business opportunities. CRP 
also established centres in Magboraka and Tonkolili Districts for women 
to seek counselling (Arthy 2003). Despite these achievements, women were 
generally neglected by the NCDDR due to their gender-neutral approach, 
which set DDR registration standards equally for men and women (Ball et 
al 2004). 
Unlike female combatants, child soldiers were placed into a separate 
programme from the beginning. It is estimated that roughly 7,000 child 
soldiers were involved in the conflict in Sierra Leone (Ball et al 2004). 
By 2002, 6,845 child soldiers were demobilised, and the strategy after 
demobilisation was to reunite child ex-combatants with their families. 
During reintegration, NCDDR, UNAMSIL, UNICEF as well as other 
organisations conducted campaigns to sensitise communities to the return 
of child ex-combatants. Community meetings, posters, and radio were the 
most common means of informing citizens (Coalition to Stop the Use of 
Child Soldiers 2006). Former youth combatants have also been well received 
by youth groups. At times organised by partnering NGOs, youth groups 
were formed around sports clubs, religious institutions or dance halls. 
These groups play a vital role in socialising ex-combatants that in many 
cases lost out on their childhood. Youth groups have also been hired to help 
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with minor infrastructure projects such as road maintenance and sanitation 
(Comninos et al 2002).
The people of Sierra Leone showed a high propensity for reconciliation, 
based on deep religious faith and fatigue from the war. Local and 
international NGOs assisted in developing a grassroots movement that 
ignited reconciliation among differing groups (Ball et al 2004). As in 
the case of Mozambique, traditional reconciliation techniques, such as 
cleansing rituals, had a positive impact on communities in Sierra Leone. In 
addition to male and female ex-combatants, traditional practices were often 
extended to child ex-combatants. In some cases, ex-combatants received 
forgiveness from entire communities after admitting wrongdoing (Ginifer 
2003). Particularly among the RUF, digging up of ‘charms’ was a popular 
ceremony. It is believed that progress in the community cannot be made 
until charms are dug up and destroyed (Arthy 2003). In tandem with the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, local reconciliation programmes 
have helped citizens to absolve those that committed horrifying acts, while 
bridging ties for a shared future. 
Measuring success of reintegration
Experts often cite the case of Sierra Leone as a DDR success story. In addition 
to the achievement of peace between the warring parties, it is due in large 
part to the accomplishment of its disarmament and demobilisation process. 
The large number of weapons collected along with the high percentage 
of demobilised combatants is indicative of a well-implemented DDR 
programme. In terms of measuring the success of reintegration, however, 
many more factors come into play. As opposed to a quantitative assessment 
of the number of ex-combatants registered for reintegration, analysts must 
look at qualitative as well as quantitative indicators to measure success. In 
other words, employment rates can be a reliable indicator pertaining to 
economic reintegration, whereas social reintegration demands perception 
indicators to measure levels of cooperation, acceptance, and trust. With 
additional time and resources, a more thorough analysis and study of 
reintegration success could be conducted. Nonetheless, given the parameters 
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of this study, three reputable analytical studies will be used for measurement 
purposes. 
The NCDDR assessment team, with the support of implementing partners, 
conducted an evaluation of Sierra Leone’s reintegration programme. 
Findings were obtained through interviews with and surveys to NCDDR 
staff as well as a sample population of ex-combatants (Comninos et al 
2002). An analysis of the following survey results from 2002, when DDR 
was completed, reflects an interesting dichotomy (See box 3). The first two 
questions are based on behaviour – quarrels and acceptance. Both findings 
suggest that ex-combatants reached a level of comfort in their communities in 
a short amount of time. This suggests that ex-combatants and communities 
benefited from reintegration programmes that aimed at sensitisation and 
normalisation. The third question, regarding trust, reveals that by 2002, 
ex-combatants had not gained a high level of trust in relation to neighbours, 
friends, and particularly family. Further analysis may explore the reasons 
behind the majority of ex-combatants distrusting family over friends and 
neighbours. It would also be useful to know whether high levels of trust 
existed prior to the conflict. In all, this survey illustrates that reconciliation 
and the establishment of social capital is a process that takes time and must 
not be ignored during DDR, and principally when these programmes end.
BOX 3 – Assimilation in Communities








Yes, all the time 1.8% 0.8% 1.0% 0.5% 0.5% 1.3%
Yes, 
but only sometimes
22.0% 30.8% 17.5% 15.0% 3.5% 4.5%
No, never 76.3% 68.5% 81.5% 84.5% 96.0% 94.3%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
n= 400
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Problems being accepted by… Family Friends Neighbours
Yes regular problems 0.8% 0.3% 0.8%
Yes occasional problems 3.0% 3.3% 3.3%
No problems 96.3% 96.5% 96.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
n= 400
Do you trust your…. Family Friends Neighbours
Yes I trust them all the time 14.0% 7.5% 6.5%
Yes I trust them, but only occasionally 7.8% 30.0% 27.8%
No I do not trust them 78.3% 62.5% 65.8%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
n= 400
Source: Comninos et al 2002
In 2003, DFID conducted an impact evaluation of their reintegration 
programmes, which were implemented by GTZ and CRP. Through 
interviews (total 27), focus group discussions (total of 30 with 10 
representatives at each), and participatory workshops with programme 
staff, DFID found that community perceptions had shifted from one of 
suspicion and distrust to one of cooperation and peaceful coexistence. 
Indicative of this was the absence of the term ‘ex-combatant’ in everyday 
conversation. Community members expressed the desire to move on from 
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past grievances, recociling differences to form cohesive communities. 
The majority of commnity members reported that relations with 
ex-combatants improved significantly from their first contact during 
demobilisation to the end of reintegration. Consistent with community 
respondents, ex-combatants expressed an absence of problems between 
the two parties (Arthy 2003). This evaluation reveals that relations 
between ex-combatants and their communities are such that an enabling 
environment has been established for economic and social development. 
Whether these conditions can be fully attributed to reintegration is 
nebulous and difficult to measure. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that 
reintegration programmes contributed to other community processes that 
may have been taking place.
Between June and August 2003, just more than a year after the conflict 
subsided, Humphreys and Weinstein conducted a study targeting a sample 
of 1,043 ex-combatants. Information was gathered through closed-ended 
questionnaires and interviews at training sites and in community centres. 
In order to obtain a representative sample it was disaggregated by region, 
gender, faction, and age. 89% of their sample joined the DDR programme, 
while 11% chose to reintegrate on their own. This ratio is consistent with 
the figure that states 7,000 out of the total 79,000 combatants did not 
join the DDR programme countrywide. According to their measure of 
successful reintegration, 93% of the respondents experienced high levels of 
reintegration success, 2% cluster at the very bottom, and 5% are dispersed 
around the middle (Humphreys & Weinstein 2004). While 7% seems to be 
an insignificant number, it represents 5,000 ex-combatants that expressed 
mild to extreme levels of dissatisfaction with reintegration. Examining 
the experience of these 5,000 ex-combatants may reveal some interesting 
insights and lessons for future DDR programmes. 
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BOX 4 – Ex-combatants' Perspective on Training
Agree (%) Disagree (%) Neither (%) # of Respondents
The training 
I received has 
prepared me well 
for my work.
75.8 19.2 5.0 318
The skills I learned 
are needed by 
employees in this 
region.
91.5 4.7 3.8 339
I am better socially 
because of the 
training I received
87.1 7.1 5.9 340
The training 
I received was 
responsible for the 
job I have.
42.9 51.6 5.5 219
Source: Humphreys & Weinstein 2004
The results (in percentages) from box 4 above demonstrate that training 
was mostly perceived to be helpful. With regard to preparation for work, 
demand of skills, and social benefits, ex-combatants responded positively. 
Interestingly, responses were mixed when asked about post-training 
employment. There are a number of economic factors that may have 
contributed to this result. 
Ex-combatants’ perspective on employment opportunities was not as 
favourable (See box 5). More than 50% of the respondents thought 
opportunities were the same or worse than before the war. These results 
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were especially poor for the SLA10 and the AFRC, who compared with the 
militias, lost more in terms of job security and social status. This result 
raises a good question regarding programme expectations. Does arriving 
at these employment results one year after the programme constitute 
failure? There are a number of externalities beyond the control of the 
reintegration programme that can affect this indicator. By isolating 
perceptions of employment opportunities, factors related to economic 
degradation from war and possible post-conflict reconstruction failures 
might be disregarded. Further studies may want to consider proposing 
benchmarks for employment opportunities following reintegration. This 
would be extremely challenging due to the complexities and variables that 
each post-conflict context contains.
BOX 5 – Employment Opportunities
Source: Humphreys & Weinstein 2004
10 Sierra Leone Army
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Conclusion
Along with the increase of involvement of the international community in 
post-conflict assistance, has come a greater focus on DDR. It has been well 
established that DDR is an essential component of post-conflict recovery. 
While development and humanitarian organisations focus on improving 
political and economic institutions and upholding the peace, particular 
attention must be paid to ex-combatants, who are most prone to become 
spoilers of the peace process. Given their access to weaponry, their 
experience with armed violence, and left-over animosity, ex-combatants 
are most likely to return to violence if conditions do not allow them to 
make the transition from war to peace. In post-conflict settings, economies 
and institutions are too damaged and fragile to absorb tens to hundreds of 
thousands of ex-combatants at once. Therefore, it is imperative that well-
planned and dynamically funded DDR programmes are implemented.
While disarmament and demobilisation are important, it is the 
reintegration phase that requires the greatest amounts of time and funding 
for successfully assisting ex-combatants and their return to sustainable 
livelihoods in their former or sometimes new communities. Typically, 
reintegration targets the individual ex-combatant with cash packages and 
job training. More recently, there has been a shift in conventional wisdom, 
calling for a community-focused approach to reintegration. Consequently, 
this study argues that both individual and community-based reintegration 
approaches are important when conducting DDR programmes.
In addition to human and financial capital, social capital must be 
cherished and nurtured in post-conflict settings. As a measure of trust and 
reciprocity, social capital is the driving force behind reconciliation and 
normalisation processes. This study attempts to show that community-
focused reintegration programmes that generate social capital will build 
networks of trust and cooperation through the community for which 
ex-combatants can rely on for a safe and sustainable return. Likewise, 
community members are able to relinquish past grievances, while focusing 
on progress and a shared vision of peace. Reintegration programmes that 
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provide its beneficiaries with an atmosphere conducive to cooperative 
organisation building, leads to an empowered civil society with the capacity 
to recycle social capital for its own benefit indefinitely. 
In order to illustrate the relationship between community-based 
reintegration programmes that promote social capital and the extent to 
which ex-combatants successfully reintegrate, this study examined the 
experience of Sierra Leone. As a current model, Sierra Leone reveals the 
advantages that a community-focused reintegration approach bequeaths 
to its recipients. While reintegration results are mixed for some indicators, 
there are, however measurable lessons that can be taken from the 
reintegration methodologies that were instituted there. Programmatic 
interventions that proved successful in Sierra Leone can be duplicated in 
future DDR scenarios, and will most likely have positive impacts if tailored 
to the post-conflict context in which they are applied.To build on the 
lessons learned from Sierra Leone, the following policy recommendations 
should be considered by current and future DDR implementing actors:A 
global fund should be established for long-term reintegration of 
ex-combatants. This would comprise a group of experts that could assess 
post-conflict reconstruction in relation to the needs of ex-combatants 
and their communities, reducing reliance on voluntary contributions of 
UN member states.
Donors should incorporate longer-term reintegration packages 1. 
that support community-based organisations engaged in 
assisting ex-combatants and their communities. Reintegration 
shall be outlined during the peace process with a designation 
of implementing organisations and funding bodies. Once 
disarmament and demobilisation are complete, funding should 
not be curtailed, but rather enhanced to ensure long-term 
recovery.
Instead of viewing reintegration as the third stage of DDR, 2. 
reintegration should be perceived as a much broader process 
that begins at the onset of DDR. 
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Coordination among the government, NGOs, community 3. 
organisations, and donors should take place as early as possible 
to avoid duplication of efforts, regional favouritism, and loss of 
confidence within communities.
Social capital should not only be nurtured during all stages of 4. 
DDR, but should also be an objective of the entire programme. 
Social capital should be strengthened by utilising existing 
community organisations, which enables communities to 
take ownership of their own development and reintegration 
of ex-combatants. Community programmes should be 
participatory, equitable, and sustainable, so that recipients can 
benefit from the programme long after completion.
DDR programme managers should encourage the establishment 5. 
of informal networks of ex-combatants, which serve as a 
platform for discussion between them and their communities.
Implementing actors must conduct participatory monitoring and 6. 
evaluation of programmes that take into account the need of all 
stakeholders. This gives ex-combatants and community members a 
sense of ownership that leads to cooperation and acceptance.
The findings of this study suggest that reintegration programmes that address 
both the needs of the individual ex-combatant and communities with 
proper funding in a timely manner will reduce the risk that ex-combatants 
will turn to lives of criminality once released from their role as combatants. 
In a world where armed conflict persists, international organisations 
should not underestimate or take for granted the transformative effects that 
social capital has on rebuilding communities. By placing programmes that 
enhance social capital at the top of the post-conflict agenda, citizens will 
become empowered to take control of their future aspirations for economic 
development, political stability, and peace. 
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